Dr. Abdul Majid Siraj was, in his youth, a soldier for the National Civil Defence in Kashmir and a witness to the events of 1947, including Indian Prime Minister Nehru’s famous and controversial speech. A retired consultant of general surgery with a postgraduate degree in Peace Studies, he has lived in the UK for the last 35 years but has never forgotten the conflicts and injustices that continue to trouble his homeland. He has published three books on the Kashmir dispute, his most recent work being ‘Kashmir Case Law’. The book is an investigation into the universal right to self-determination and the laws that are supposed to uphold it. Dr. Siraj was recently in Srinagar where he shared his views with Conveyor correspondent M Farooq Shah. Excerpts:
You’ve spent three and a half decades in England practicing medicine and yet you decide to write your books about Kashmir. Seems strange, doesn’t it?
There’s nothing strange about it. Every year, I came back to my home country—Kashmir. There was a lot of disillusionment and dismay and I had to come back each time carrying the burden of the travesty of justice there and the injustices that were perpetrated against my countrymen. So I returned with a heavy heart to the United Kingdom and was compelled to try and do something individually. That’s why I started writing.
A great deal has been written on Kashmir over the years as you know. How is your work any different from the information already available on the subject?
I think it’s completely different from what has been written on the subject before. I went through a lot of literature on Kashmir and saw libraries full of books on the history of Kashmir, ancient and present and also on the governance of Kashmir from 1947 to the present. I saw books on travel; on the beauty and scenery of Kashmir. But no book focused on the causes of injustices or the legal basis, due to which calamities have continually befallen the people of Kashmir. No other book I’d come across discussed these vital questions.
What are the areas in your book that you feel are unique and never previously touched on by other writers?
If you collate international law with the genesis of accession of Kashmir to India and the subsequent events, I think no legal basis has been touched upon yet by any book that I’ve come across. I wanted to put the two together: compare international law on inter-state relations and relations of the state with its people, and then see if they fit in with the scenario of Kashmir and explain why Kashmir is suffering.
Your book suggests that the instrument of accession signed by Maharaja, with the dominion of India and its ratification by the Constituent Assembly in 1951, holds no water.
It’s contentious. There are genuine questions asked about the accession deed and as a ploy, the government of India had to constitute a way of validating it by getting the local assembly to ratify it or to reinforce their weak claims. The message of my book is that the instrument of accession is a legally flawed document.
During the tumultuous times of 1947, as a young man you were brandishing a .303 rifle, a soldier for the national civil defence in Kashmir, and on duty while the late prime minister of India, Jawahar Lal Nehru, was addressing Kashmiris in Lal Chowk, promising them the right to self-determination What, for you, was the motivation?
We were only small children at the time, 10 at the most, but we were given training to form a militia so that we could create a civil defence force to guard ourselves and our homes against any potential attack. We had volunteered for it because our family was an ardent supporter of the National Conference and of Sheikh Abdullah.
So you were part of the group whose slogan was, “Hamla Awar Hoshiyar, Hum Kashmiri Hain Tayyar.” [Beware invaders (Pakistani tribesmen), Kashmiris are ready to fight you.]?
That’s right. We were on duty when pandit Nehru was making his speech in a very ambiguous way.
Many believe conspiracies were being hatched even before the British were to leave India. Before the partition of India, Gandhi and some other Hindu leaders mysteriously came here and held secret discussions with the Dogra rulers and the National Conference leaders to chalk out their designs for Kashmir. What are your views on this?
I agree. There have been speculations on that, but you can’t find them in archives because if there is a conspiracy it would never be officially documented. If you put all the facts together it raises many suspicious questions: Gandhi’s presence here; Pandit Nehru’s instructions to Mountbatten to arrest Ram Chand Kak and to release Abdullah, asking red cliff to give the Zera district to India so that they could have a way in; Gandhi instructing people to make certain changes to bridges and roads to Kashmir—all these suggest a conspiracy. Alistair Lamb has further evidence on the matter.
In his book ‘My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir’, former governor Jagmohan states: “Gandhi’s visit to Kashmir in July–August 1947, his meeting with the Maharaja on August 1, dismissal of R C Kak from the office of prime minster on August 10 , release of Sheikh Abdullah on September 29, after tendering ‘unqualified apology’ in his letter of September 26, strengthening of the road link between Pathankot and Jammu, and the scheme to construct a boat bridge over the river Ravi--all would seem to suggest that ground was being prepared for accession of the state to India; at least the possibility was not being ruled out…..” Do you agree with his evaluation?
I’m in complete agreement with what Mr Jagmohan has said about Gandhi and his suspicious visit, though I may not fully agree with everything he has claimed in his book.
Dr. Mustafa Kamal, whom you’ve called ‘Abdullah's beloved son’ in a recent write-up, would have us believe that his father had no role in the signing of accession. What is your personal opinion, being a family friend of Abdullah’s, and possibly knowing better than the most?
I personally feel that Sheikh Abdullah was more or less driven into a position that was perfidious. He was attracted to the idea of a free Kashmir, and even after partition he was still working towards an autonomous Jammu and Kashmir. He’s also supported peoples’ verdict on where they’d like to go after all the dust has settled. He was not an out and out advocate for accession to India and was reluctant on the issue, but because he was under the influence of the congress and government of India, he had no choice but to go along with what was said at that time. The history is evident and it’s on record that India didn’t start with Kashmir as its integral part. That was never claimed even by the government of India.
Given the conversion of the Muslim Conference into the National Conference, his change of attitude after being released and the November 13, 1974 Indira-Abdullah accord—does history not portray Sheikh Abdullah as a villain?
Absolutely. History would portray Sheikh Abdullah in a very negative light. Whatever happened after his release from prison, he was compromised, and that compromise represents a dark area in his political career.
In 2006, Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Anan, described the UN resolutions on Kashmir as irrelevant stressing that until India and Pakistan reached a mutual understanding, they can’t be implemented. Where does this put Kashmir?
Kofi Anan was apparently referring to the absence of agreement between India and Pakistan on the resolutions in question. Under Chapter 7, the United Nations cannot help countries arrive at a decision unless there’s a body of Security Council members who unanimously pass a resolution authorising the UN to act. You’ve to build a consensus among the UN members, motivate countries, preach your case, take my book for example and tell them we’re suffering and there’s a case for us and therefore prove the UN should support us. The cause might then ascend into the Security Council’s resolutions and, if it is not vetoed by Russia or somebody else, and is implemented, might indeed put pressure on India to administer justice here. I’m hopeful someday the people of Kashmir will be motivated to work on a single track. Once that happens they could come out and prove to the world that they have a very valid case.
The 1987 elections—rigging or no rigging— are largely considered as a watershed point which made the uprising against the Indian rule in Kashmir inevitable. Would you agree?
I wouldn’t put it down to the elections at that time. The local politics has not played any role and elections to me are like dead drift wood as I have mentioned in my book. The insurrection took place when the people realised their demands had not been met since 1947. Due to this the uprising was indeed, as you say, inevitable.
Since the mass uprising of the Kashmiris post-1989, developments morphed into a full-scale armed resistance. Many believe it highlighted the ordinary Kashmiris’ standpoint on the very issue. Do you believe it was an incorrect or an uncalled for intervention?
Armed resistance or guerrilla warfare is not seen as an illegal act before the international community. You’ll find all countries that achieved nationhood—Namibia, Algeria, Swapo, Kosovo etc—had armed guerrilla groups fighting for independence. Armed resistance, therefore, is quite legal.
The armed resistance quickly disintegrated into a confusing discord with each group claiming its share in the polity. What’s your evaluation of this outcome?
Very unfortunate, I should say. That’s where it fizzled out but that may have been the design by the administration. They provoked discord in the ranks and got them to fight with each other.
The emergence of the Hurriyat Conference was an entirely new development after the pro-Indian politicians disappeared from the scene during this period. How do you view their credibility as a representation of the public sentiment?
It was a good attempt. In the absence of a single leader spearheading the popular movement, Hurriyat’s the point of salvage for the people of Kashmir; imagine there was no Hurriyat, what would be the state of the resistance movement? You’d have a vacuum.
The Hurriyat Conference split into as many fragments as it was composed of, leaving Kashmiris without any true representation. Is there any hope?
Very true. If there was a single leader who was able to motivate them all in one direction, that would be ideal and would lead to a situation like that of Cuba. One leader takes a nation all the way—to success. At the moment, we’re living in a vacuum, but whatever we have; we’ve to catch hold of it like a drowning man would a straw.
Many believe Indian intelligence agencies engineered the split in the Hurriyat Conference. Could the Kashmiri Diaspora living abroad not take the reins into their hands?
The Kashmiri Diaspora living abroad is doing its bit but can’t lead a country while living in different parts of the world. You need a leader at the epicentre of the conflict.
Individuals and groups have emerged in large numbers in the US and Europe, claiming to champion the cause of Kashmir. Do they serve the Kashmiris’ cause?
Honestly, I’ve never investigated that aspect because it doesn’t bother me. I don’t point fingers at people if I see them going in what I see to be the right direction. Even if they speak before the British Parliamentarians or before the Congress people in America, whatever they do in their affiliations with India, Pakistan or Indian intelligence doesn’t bother me as long as they don’t cross a limit: as long as they remain fully dedicated to their work. These people—Tramboo, Fayaz Shawl, and Fai—spend a lot of money attracting influential people to lobby the cause. They’re fully dedicated to their political work. The Congressmen in America will say, ‘Come on, we speak for you, how much do you pay?’ The more you pay, the more they speak for you. They treat the other parties they speak for the same. Obviously, I don’t know who pays them; it’s not an open secret. But nobody pays me, I can tell you that. (Breaks into laughter)
On the contrary, are Kashmiri Pandits not seemingly more organised and at times creating a mountain out of a molehill?
There’s a discord within the Kashmiri Pandit community as well. There’s a camp whose aims are close to the Kashmiri political movement, while the others are acting for the Indian administration and trying to play their part. It’s a minority, you see, and it’s relatively easy to a forge a unity between them.
The European Union which was also supportive of Kashmir’s cause in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmiri people seems to have taken a U-turn on its earlier policies. Is Kashmir’s a diplomatic failure?
There was one person, Emma Nicholson, who came here from the EU and took a U-turn on Kashmir, but we’ve unqualified support from the majority of the members of the European Union. I must tell you, they’re in support of the people of Kashmir rather than the Indian claim, though more lobbying and work in that direction is needed.
The buzzword for the government of India right now is ‘quiet diplomacy’, without actually reviewing its arbitrary constitutional position on Kashmir. How do you view it?
I think ‘quiet diplomacy’ or ‘quiet dialogue’ sound to me a kind of warning for the people not to expect too much from this process. If there are issues about Kashmir, they’re open to the world. The negotiations should not be held in a furtive manner, there’s no need for that. Whether Hurriyat should go for it or not, I’d suggest not leaving any avenue untouched, try to not commit to anything. Let them go and hear what the Indian government have to say, and obviously then they should come back and tell the people that they tried quiet diplomacy and all the government did was order them to sign on a piece of blank paper, which on behalf of the people they refused to do.
In a recent presentation you remarked that Kashmir has not had peaceful governance which makes the Kashmiri case for plebiscite stronger. Conversely, do you believe that good governance can be an alternative to plebiscite?
I was only trying to explain an avenue of International Law which says if you’ve a record of good governance for a long period of time wherein people are happy and enjoying their full rights, there’s no cause for self-determination because people wouldn’t ask for it in the first place.
Assuming the government of India accedes to your terms—good governance, return of assets and the right to a dignified life—would you desist from asking for your right to self determination?
I’d be happy to say that I could live contently if my life’s secure, if my career’s secure, if my children’s careers are secure, if I’m not repressed, if all my assets have been restored to me, all the forests have been restored to me, all the energy, water and everything in Jammu and Kashmir are restored to me. If I’ve been given back my historic entitlement to all my territories, and all these parts put together, and then there’s the like of India or Pakistan or anybody else to have an affliction with, I would not request self-determination. That affiliation will be on the basis of equity, complete respect for each other as two partners, and under those circumstances I could say: all right India, you’re one person and I’m another, and we can shake hands.
The interview appeared in the February issue of the Conveyor magazine,www.conveyormagazine.com, being published from Srinagar Kashmir
Posts
